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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
ROBERT MICHAEL DAVIS,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 47637-2019
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR28-19-10439

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robert Michael Davis appeals from the district court’s Judgment.

Mr. Davis was

sentenced to a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, for his possession of a
controlled substance conviction. He asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it
failed to give proper consideration to the mitigating factors present in his case. Additionally, he
asserts that the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction
of sentence.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On July 9, 2019, an Information was filed charging Mr. Davis with possession of a
controlled substance, methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.53-54.)
The charges were the result of a search conducted after a traffic stop. (PSI, p.5.)1 Mr. Davis
entered a guilty plea to the possession of methamphetamine charge and the remaining charge was
dismissed. (R., pp.68, 79.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a unified sentence of five years, with two years
fixed. (Tr., p.18, Ls.18-22.) Defense counsel requested that Mr. Davis be placed on probation.
(Tr., p.22, Ls.13-15.) The Presentence Investigator recommended that Mr. Davis be placed on a
period of retained jurisdiction. (PSI, p.17.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of five
years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.81-82.) Mr. Davis filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the
district court’s Judgment. (R., pp.84-86.) He also filed a timely Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.94-95.)
The motion was denied. (Augmentation2: Order Denying Defendant’s Rule 35 Motion.)

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. Davis, a unified
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, following his plea of guilty to possession of
a controlled substance, methamphetamine?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Davis’s Idaho Criminal Rule
35 Motion?

1

For ease of reference, the electronic file containing the Presentence Investigation Report and
attachments will be cited as “PSI” and referenced pages will correspond with the electronic page
numbers contained in this file.
2
Mr. Davis’s Motion to Augment was granted on 3/27/2020.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Davis, A Unified Sentence
Of Five Years, With Two Years Fixed, Following His Plea Of Guilty To Possession Of A
Controlled Substance, Methamphetamine
Mr. Davis asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of five years, with
two years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an
excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection
of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Davis does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Davis must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing
State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown,
121 Idaho 385 (1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility
of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138
(2001)).
Appellate courts use a four-part test for determining whether a district court abused its
discretion: Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
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acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). Mr. Davis asserts that the
district court failed to give consideration to the mitigating factors that exist in his case and, as a
result, did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason.
Mr. Davis asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the mitigating factors
that exist in his case. Specifically, he asserts that the district court failed to give proper
consideration to his admitted substance abuse problem and desire for treatment. Idaho courts
have previously recognized that substance abuse and a desire for treatment should be considered
as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103
Idaho 89 (1982).
Mr. Davis began using alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine as a
methamphetamine at the

and

. (PSI, p.13.) His drug of choice is methamphetamine.

(PSI, p.13.) He was diagnosed with Stimulant Use Disorder – Amphetamine Type, Severe – In a
Controlled Environment. (PSI, p.19.) Although he has been able to remain sober for years at a
time, before the instant offence, he made some poor choices and relapsed. (PSI, p.13.) He is
now about “100% ready to remain abstinent.” (PSI, p.24.)

It was recommended that he

participate in Level 1 Outpatient Treatment. (PSI, p.28.)
Mr. Davis did not wait to begin treatment, but enrolled in the 24/7 program prior to
sentencing. (PSI, p.28.) Mr. Bassett, from the 24/7 program indicated that Mr. Davis was doing
well in the program. (Tr., p.21, Ls.24-25.) Mr. Davis was in the middle of the program when he
was sentenced and still had eight months of inpatient treatment and six months of outpatient
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treatment before completing the program.

(Tr., p.22, Ls.1-3.)

Mr. Davis also obtained a

substance abuse mentor through the St. Vincent program. (Tr., p.22, Ls.4-.6.)
Further, Mr. Davis has a job waiting for him upon release. (PSI, p.12.) The Idaho
Supreme Court has found that employment opportunities constitute mitigating information.
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). Although he was previously fired due to his use of
methamphetamine, Mr. Davis’s prior employer, Curtis Kluesner, noted that Mr. Davis
“definitely” would be rehired upon release, as long as he maintained his sobriety. (PSI, p.12.)
Mr. Kluesner stated that “when [Mr. Anderon] is clean and sober, he has a great work ethic and
is a generally a good person.” (PSI, p.12.)
Additionally, Mr. Davis has expressed his remorse for committing the instant offense and
a willingness to move forward with treatment. In State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App.
1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the sentence imposed, “In light of Alberts’ expression
of remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment
and other positive attributes of his character.” Id. 121 Idaho at 209. Mr. Davis has admitted that
he is embarrassed and ashamed about committing the instance offense. (PSI, p.6.) He wants to
put his relapse behind him and put everything he can into treatment and his faith so that he will
be able to succeed in the future. (PSI, p.15.)
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Davis asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that had the district court
properly considered his substance abuse, desire for continued treatment, employment
opportunity, and remorse, it would have crafted a sentence that focused on his further
rehabilitation rather than incarceration.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Davis’s Rule 35 Motion
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App.1987) and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447
(Ct. App. 1984)). “The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the
same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id. (citing
Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450). “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant
must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional information presented with the
motion for reduction. Id. (citing State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114 (Ct. App. 1991)). “When
presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of
new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
Mr. Davis supplied additional information to the district court though his testimony at the
Rule 35 hearing. He noted that he has been unable to qualify for continuing treatment from the
Idaho Department of Correction. (2/21/20 Tr., p.6, Ls.16-23.) However, he has completed the
program he began in Kootenai County Jail that was provided by Pasto Rick. (2/21/20 Tr., p.6,
L.24 – p.7, L.2.) He received a certificate for completing the faith-based one-step recovery
program. (2/21/20 Tr., p.7, Ls.6-13.) Mr. Davis discussed the 24/7 program he was enrolled in
at the time of sentencing and noted that he was doing well in it and “felt like [he] was getting a
lot from it.” (2/21/20 Tr., p.9-14.)
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He requested that his sentence either be set to three or three-and-a-half years fixed to
allow him to top out and move to out of state to be with his son or, alternatively, that he be
allowed to resume his participation in the 24/7 program.
Mr. Davis asserts that in light of the above additional information and the mitigating
factors mentioned in section I, which need not be repeated, but are incorporated by reference, the
district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Davis respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion be
vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 9th day of June, 2020.

/s/ Elizabeth Ann Allred
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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